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1. Introduction           
           Theories of finance and economic growth suggest that the financial functions provided by 
banks (and other financial intermediaries) are important in promoting economic growth. 
Empirical research strongly supports the view that banks promote economic growth at the firm, 
industry and country levels. Recent literature also highlights that not only is the aggregate size of 
financial intermediaries important for economic growth, but also that the institutional framework 
of the banking sector can significantly  affect economic growth.2   Asset-pricing theory 
suggests, and previous research has documented, that stock market returns predict future 
economic growth.3  Starting from the proposition that a well-developed banking system fosters 
economic growth, we extend the literature on finance and growth by investigating whether bank 
stock returns contain information about future economic growth that is independent of the 
information contained by overall market returns. Because firm-bank relationships are mostly 
private, especially when privately held firms are involved, this information should be 
independent of the information contained in market returns, which only reflect publicly available 
information about public companies. This is an attractive approach because publicly traded 
banks are broadly representative of a country’s banking sector, so that banking industry stock 
returns will broadly reflect the performance of a country’s banking sector. 
 The existing literature does not measure the performance of bank functioning directly; 
instead, it relies primarily upon the aggregate size of bank credit as an indicator of financial 
development, where higher ratios of bank credit to GDP indicate better functioning of a 
country’s banking sector. We argue that banking industry stock returns are a complimentary 
measure of financial development because they reflect the quality of bank credits, which is just 
                                                          
2 See, for example, La Porta et al. (2002) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001). 
3 See, for example, Fama (1981, 1990) and Schwert (1990). 
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as important as the size of bank credits. If bank credit is allocated to politically desirable but 
unprofitable projects, then the effect of bank credit on financial development and subsequent 
economic growth will be negative (La Porta et al. 2002). Previous researchers have documented 
that the markets for actively traded bank securities are efficient and and reflect information about 
the quality of bank loan portfolios (Bruner and Simms 1987; Cornell and Shapiro 1986). The 
efficiency of capital allocation and the performance of the projects funded with bank credit, i.e., 
the overall functioning of banks, will directly affect banks’ future cash flows, which, in turn, will 
be reflected in banks’ stock prices.  
Because the functioning of banks is a significant determinant of economic growth, in an 
efficient market there should be a relationship between banking industry stock prices and future 
economic growth. Moreover, those country-specific and institutional characteristics that affect 
the functioning of banks and market efficiency also should influence this relationship. From this 
point of view, we examine the dynamic relationship between the stock prices of the banking 
industry and future economic growth.  
We address this issue using dynamic panel estimations. We construct value-weighted 
excess returns for portfolios of banks listed on domestic stock exchanges in 36 markets, 
including 18 developed markets and 18 emerging markets. We then analyze the relationship 
between the continuous growth rates of real GDP and the lagged values of bank excess returns 
using panel GMM (Generalized-Method-of-Moments) techniques. We first examine all markets 
together and then examine developed markets and emerging markets separately.  
In our panel studies, we also investigate the impact of country-specific and banking 
industry characteristics on the link between bank stock returns and growth. We construct 
variables for country-specific and institutional characteristics that are relevant to growth and 
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financial development, including the level of government ownership of banks, enforcement of 
insider trading law, systemic banking crises, regulation of bank accounting disclosure and 
financial development. We then interact these variables with bank stock returns to investigate the 
impact of those country-specific and institutional characteristics on growth through bank stock 
prices.  
This study contributes to the literature on finance and growth in at least two important 
ways. First, we document a positive and significant link between bank stock returns and future 
economic growth that is independent of the previously documented relationship between overall 
market returns and growth.  This link ties together the literature on banks and economic growth 
with that on stock markets and economic growth. The banking industry is special in that it is the 
primary source of credit to both public and private firms in all industries; this is why there is 
extensive literature documenting the importance of financial development, measured as the 
aggregate size of bank credits against GDP, in promoting economic growth for a large number of 
countries. We observe that, in an efficient capital market, bank stock returns reflect the expected 
future cash flows of banks, which, in turn, reflect the future performance of bank credits to both 
public and private firms. Therefore, bank stock returns should act as a good indicator of the 
overall performance of bank credit activities, especially where financial markets (both equity and 
debt) are not well developed. Not surprisingly, regardless of the sample or technique used, we 
find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the lagged values of bank excess 
returns and the continuous growth rates of GDP. We also find that the results are more prominent 
for emerging markets, where public debt markets are poorly developed or non-existent and banks 
are the main source of credits for private and public firms. This finding is consistent with Rajan 
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(1992), who finds that the importance of relationship banking is attenuated when firms have 
access to public debt markets.  
Second, we investigate the impact of a series of country-specific and banking 
institutional characteristics on growth through banking stock prices, using a set of interaction 
variables between bank stock returns and country/institutional characteristics. We find that much 
of the information content of bank returns about future economic growth is captured by those 
country-specific and institutional characteristics, which is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies: The positive relationship between bank stock returns and economic growth is 
significantly strengthened by the enforcement of insider trading law, banking crises, bank 
disclosure regulations and financial development, but is weakened by government ownership of 
banks. Our results are robust in the presence of overall market returns, non-banking-sector 
returns, and the spread of government borrowings, and are consistent with the different measure 
of bank stock returns. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2, we provide a brief 
review of the related literature and highlight our major contributions. In Section 3, we describe 
our data and methodology. In Section 4, we report the empirical results related to the link 
between bank stock returns and future economic growth as well as the influence of country-
specific and institutional characteristics on this link, using dynamic panel GMM estimations. 
Section 5 reports a series of robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related literature 
 
This paper is related to a few strands of literature, the details of literature review can be 
referred to the early version of this paper (Cole, et al 2007).  In this section we focus on the 
contributions of our paper. 
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The first one is the literature on banks and economic growth. Starting with King and 
Levine (1993), numerous papers have established that a well-developed banking system 
promotes economic growth. And this positive effect of financial development on growth is found 
to be robust to different econometric methods, Levine (2005) provides an excellent review on the 
recent research in this area.  
Our research builds upon existing empirical studies of financial development and 
economic growth but is substantially different from those studies. Previous research has 
extended the classical growth models by emphasizing the important role of bank credit in 
economic growth while controlling for factors traditionally thought to affect growth. These 
studies examine the steady-state finance and growth relationship and investigate whether the 
static level of financial development can promote long-run economic growth. In contrast, our 
work focuses on short-term economic growth, examining the dynamic relationship between 
banks and growth. Instead of arguing whether or how banks affect future economic growth 
which is the main issue of previous research, we examine whether the stock returns of banking 
industry contain information about future economic growth. 
Our study also distinguishes itself from previous research by not only examining whether 
the stock returns of the banking industry can forecast future economic growth, but also going 
further to investigate whether those institutional characteristics which affect financial 
development and economic growth will also affect the predictive power of the banking stock 
returns. We interact our measure of bank excess returns with the following variables:  
Banking crises: Empirical research has shown that a banking crisis imposes substantial 
costs on a country’s economy (Hoggarth et al. 2002); however, no paper has examined how 
                                                          
6 The information about the number of listed banks in the bank portfolio of each market, and the country-specific 
and banking institutional variables could be found at Cole, et al (2007). 
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banking crises affect economic growth through banking stock prices. Whereas Loayaz and 
Ranciere (2001) use traditional measures of financial development (Private Credit and Liquid 
Liabilities) to study how systemic banking crises affect long-run economic growth through 
financial development, we investigate how systemic banking crises affect short-run economic 
growth through bank stock returns. The crisis indicator variable they interact with financial 
development identifies countries that experienced a systemic banking crisis; the indicator 
variable in our interaction term identifies the period when a country was undergoing a systemic 
banking crisis. We are the first to document that the positive link between bank returns and 
economic growth is strengthened by systemic banking crises.   
Bank accounting disclosure standards: Several papers on finance and growth emphasize 
the relevance of accounting disclosure standards to growth ( Rajan and Zingales ,1998; Carlin 
and Mayer, 2003). Our work is different from previous research in two main respects. First, we 
construct a new index of accounting disclosure standards that is specific to banks using data 
from Barth, et al (2001) whereas previous research uses a much more generic measure of  
accounting disclosure. Barth, et al (2004) use their data to find that bank accounting standards 
forcing accurate information disclosure promote bank performance and stability; however, they 
don’t link the bank disclosure standards to economic growth. Second, we examine how bank 
accounting disclosure standards affect GDP growth through the stock prices of the banking 
industry. We find that the bank accounting disclosure regulation magnifies the positive link 
between bank excess returns and growth, and that this effect is primarily induced by the data 
from emerging markets. 
Insider trading law: The “law and finance” literature posits that the legal environment is 
a significant determinant of financial development and growth (La Porta, et al 1998, 2000). 
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Legal origin and other indicators of legal efficiency are often used as the instruments of financial 
development in the finance and growth literature to extract the exogenous component of 
financial development, and are found to boost growth of the levels of country (Beck, et, al 2000), 
industry (Beck and Levine 2002) and firm growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998 ). 
However, to our knowledge, no one has linked insider trading law to growth. 
We argue that the enforcement of insider trading law is not only relevant to market 
efficiency but also to economic growth. Empirical research indicates that insider trading has a 
negative impact on market liquidity (Fishe and Robe 2004) but that enforcement of insider 
trading law can improve market liquidity (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002); while market liquidity 
is a key indicator of stock market development in promoting growth. The cost of equity in a 
country does not change after the enactment of insider trading law but decreases significantly 
after the enforcement (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). This finding is important because one of 
the main objectives of the stock markets is to make it easier for companies to raise financing 
through equity, the reduction of equity cost will benefit companies traded in the stock exchanges 
and attract more companies to raise funds through IPOs. Therefore, the enforcement of insider 
trading law also indirectly boosts economic growth. 
Government ownership of banks: We also investigate whether government ownership of 
banks affects the relationship between bank stock prices and economic growth. Previous 
empirical work suggests that government ownership of banks is negatively associated with bank 
development and economic growth (La Porta et al. 2002) and positively related to the level of 
bank non-performing loans (Barth et al. 2004). Government ownership of banks could 
negatively affect the quality of bank credit by funneling bank loans to inefficient but politically 
desirable projects (Sapienza 2004; Dinc 2005). We find that the positive relationship between 
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bank stock returns and economic growth weakens as the level of government bank ownership 
rises.  
Financial development: Following the literature on financial development and growth, 
we construct the three traditional measures of financial development for each country: private 
credit, liquid liabilities and commercial-central bank. We find that greater financial development 
strengthens the relationship between bank stock returns and economic growth.   
The second strand of literature is stock markets and economic growth. There are two 
avenues in this area, one focuses on the relationship of stock markets and long-term economic 
growth, which is in line with the study on banks and economic growth. The other one examines 
the relationship between stock market returns and short-term future economic growth, which is 
similar to our study. However, our paper extends this strand of literature in at least three 
respects. 
First, previous studies of the relationship between stock returns and economic growth 
have mainly focused on the U.S. and other developed markets. Our research studies the 
relationship between economic growth and banking industry stock returns with the control of 
market index returns in a broader international setting that includes 18 emerging markets and 18 
developed markets. This paper is the first empirical study that links bank stock returns with 
future economic growth. Banks have comparative advantages at assessing private firm 
information and monitoring managers. Banks make lending decisions based on this private 
information, and banks’ lending decisions provide signals about the borrowers’ creditworthness 
when the decisions become publicly available; therefore banks play an important, and perhaps 
unique, role as transmitters of information in capital markets (James 1987, Lummer and 
McConell 1989). The quality of bank loans can affect the firm values of both the borrowers 
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(Slovin et al. 1993, and Billett et al. 1995) and the lenders (Bharath et al. 2007). Therefore, in an 
efficient market, bank stock returns should contain additional information that is independent of 
the overall market index which consists of the publicly traded firms only. Second, the previous 
studies generally examine the relationship between stock market returns and growth for 
individual developed economies in a time-series analysis, whereas we examine not only whether 
bank returns can predict future economic growth but also whether the predictive power is 
affected by a series of country-specific and institutional characteristics in the panel 
estimations.Finally, our research improves upon the methodology used in these previous studies 
by utilizing GMM techniques.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
Our data set includes information for 38 markets, and covers the period from 1973 to 
2001. The selection of markets is based on the data availability on bank equity prices, quarterly 
GDP series and short-term interet rates. After a tedious selection process by checking data from 
different databases, we have 18 developed and 18 developing markets left in our data set, with 
the longest time series of 28 years for Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and 
United States, and shortest of 6 years for Poland, 
We use quarterly stock prices and market capitalizations of individual banks to construct 
returns on a portfolio of banks for each market. The quarterly stock prices and market 
capitalizations of individual banks and the market price index for each country are extracted 
from Datastream International, adjusting for capital changes. The interest rates and GDP series 
are taken from International Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund), Datastream 
International, OECD national account, complementally. Other data are derived and constructed 
from a variety of sources. Table 1 presents definitions of the main variables in our study along 
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with their sources. We divide the panel data into three sample groups: all markets, developed 
markets and emerging markets. To maximize the time-series content in our estimations, we use 
overlapping annual data with quarterly observations.  
Summary descriptive statistics for the panel data are presented in Table 2, while 
deicriptive statistics for individual countries are not reported here but are available on request 
from the authors. For the full panel, the average GDP growth rate is 1.3% with a range of -9.0% 
to 9.2%, the average market excess return is -6.1% with a range of -90.2% to 57%, and the 
average bank excess return is −8.1% with a range of -207.3% to 63.3%. The extreme negative 
values for both market excess returns and bank excess returns result from the high short-term 
interest rates that were prevalent in some of these markets during the sample periods. The simple 
correlation between GDP growth rates and market excess returns is 0.359 for the sample of all 
markets, and 0.406 for developed markets and 0.470 for emerging markets. The simple 
correlation between the GDP growth rates and bank excess returns is 0.336 for developed 
markets, 0.403 for emerging markets and 0.295 for the full panel. Bank excess returns are highly 
correlated with market excess returns, with the simple correlation of 0.772, 0.781 and 0.744 for 
the sample of all markets, developed markets and emerging markets, respectively6. 
3.2 Methodology  
To estimate the relationship between bank excess stock returns and economic growth, we 
begin with a fixed-effect dynamic model: 
itititiiit XYY εηβλα ++++= −− )1()1( '         (1) 
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The subscripts i and t denote country and time period, respectively; Y i is the GDP growth 
rate for country i; X i is a vector of explanatory variables for country i, in this case, market excess 
returns Rm, bank excess returns Rb and the interactions between Rb and the indicator variables 
for country and institutional characteristics; η ι is the unobservable country-specific fixed effect 
for country i; and εit is an error term.  
Substantial problems arise in the estimation of such a model, however. In both the fixed 
and random effects settings, the difficulty is that the lagged dependent variable is correlated to 
the disturbance, even with the assumption that the disturbance is not itself autocorrelated. The 
least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is also known to produce biased coefficient 
estimates when applied to equations with lagged dependent variables and fixed effects in a data 
set with small time dimension (Nickell, 1981). 
The general approach relies on instrumental variable estimators and, more recently, on a 
GMM estimator. Group effects can be swept from the fixed-effect model by taking the first 
differences in eq. (1). This model is still complicated because of the correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the disturbance. However, without the group effects, this problem 
can be easily solved by introducing proper instrumental variables. To address this correlation 
and the endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using the lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables as instruments for their first differences. They also propose a two-step 
GMM estimator. The first-step estimation assumes the error terms to be independent and 
homoskedastic across countries and over time. The second-step estimation relaxes the 
assumption of independence and homoskedasticity by using the residuals obtained from the first 
step estimation to construct a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. Thus, when 
                                                          
10 Tables and empirical results associated with these tests are not reported here, due to concerns about the length of 
the paper; however, they are available on request from the authors. 
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the error term itε  is heteroskedastic, the two-step estimator is more efficient  
Ahn and Schmidt (1995), among others, observe that this difference estimator neglects a 
lot of information and is therefore inefficient. For example, the instrument is uncorrelated with 
the differences of disturbances that are at least two periods subsequent. Therefore, a large 
amount of information has been culled not only from the familiar relationships among the levels 
of the variables but also from the implied relationships between the levels and the first 
differences.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest addressing these problems by using GMM to jointly 
estimate the original level regressions and the first-differenced regressions, where the lagged 
first-differenced variables are used as instruments in the level regressions, and the lagged level 
variables are used as instruments in the first-differenced regression. Simulations suggest that a 
system-GMM estimator can provide dramatic gains in precision and efficiency over the first-
differenced GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell, et al  2000). 
We use both the traditional first-differenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
and the more recent system-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995) for dynamic panel data, 
which we denote as GMM-Dif and GMM-Sys, respectively. Although the GMM-Sys estimator 
can usefully overcome many of the disappointing features of the GMM-Dif estimator for the 
dynamic panel model, the GMM-Sys estimator is not necessarily superior to the GMM-Dif 
estimator in all circumstances. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that the gains of GMM-Sys 
relative to GMM-Dif occur under two circumstances: first, when the autoregressive parameter is 
close to unity; and, second, when the number of the time-series observations is moderately small. 
Simulations suggest that the problem of weak instruments for the GMM-Dif becomes serious 
when the value of the autoregressive parameter exceeds 0.8. The poor performance of GMM-Dif 
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improves with an increase of the number of time periods. Our data set includes 36 markets with 
the longest time period of 110 and the shortest of 21. The number of time periods is relatively 
larger, and the autoregressive parameter is relatively small (below 0.8). Hence, we present 
results based upon both methodologies. 
For each methodology, we also choose to present the results from one-step estimations. 
Although the one-step estimator is asymptotically inefficient relative to the two-step estimator, 
simulations by Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that asymptotic inferences based on the one-
step estimators are more reliable and have the correct empirical level, while asymptotic 
inferences based on the two-step estimators can be seriously misleading, and tend to reject the 
null hypothesis too frequently. This tendency is exaggerated when the errors are non-normal or 
heteroskedastic. The main objective of this study is to examine whether bank stock prices 
contain information about future economic growth. We address this issue by looking at the 
significance of the coefficients of relevant variables rather than the magnitude of the relevant 
coefficients. Therefore, the one-step results are more reliable for this task. 
For a given sample size of cross sections, using too many instruments may result in 
overfitting bias. Especially when the number of time periods is large relative to the number of 
cross sections, this overfitting will become very serious in the presence of endogenous regressors 
(Doornik et al. 2002). The Sargan tests show that our estimations also suffer this 
overindentification problem. Therefore, in order to minimize the overidentification problem, 
instead of using the whole history of lagged level series as instruments for the cross-sectional 
regressions, we use the level variables as instruments only up to three lags for the first-
differenced regressions. In addition, the GMM results are consistent with those obtained using 
panel OLS fixed-effect regressions. 
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The assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms is essential for the consistency 
of GMM estimator. We run the tests based on estimates of the residuals in first difference. These 
tests are based on the standardized average residual autocovariances which are asymptocially 
normally distributed with zero means and unit variance. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
the tests that the error terms εit are not serially correlated, which is evidenced by significant 
negative first order serial correlation in differenced residuals (i.e. 
1,
ˆˆ
−− tiit εε ) , and no second 
order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals ( Arellano and Bond 1991, Doornik et al 
2002), gives support to our results. 
Our panel data set is unbalanced, so we follow the recommendation of Arellano and 
Bond (1991) for handling missing observations. When a country has incomplete data, the rows 
of the instrument matrix corresponding to the missing equations are deleted, and the remaining 
missing values in the instrument matrix are replaced by zeros.  
4. Empirical results 
In this section, we test the ability of bank excess stock returns to predict economic 
growth in a panel analysis combining data for all 36 markets, and then examine whether this 
relationship is influenced by a series of country-specific characteristics. To address this issue, we 
interact bank excess returns with these country-specific variables. The signs on the coefficients 
of these interaction terms indicate whether these variables strengthen or weaken the ability of 
bank excess returns to forecast economic growth.  
Panels A and B of Table 3 report the results for all markets using GMM-Dif and GMM-
Sys technique, respectively. Panels A and B of Tables 4 present the GMM-Dif results for 
developed and emerging markets, respectively, while Panels A and B of Table 5 present the 
GMM-Sys results for developed and emerging markets, respectively. For comparison purposes, 
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results from the OLS fixed-effects estimations are presented in Appendix Tables 1 (All Markets) 
and 2 (Developed versus Emerging Markets), respectively.  
The results from GMM-Sys and GMM-Dif are quite consistent, which supports Blundell 
and Bond (1998)’s suggestion that the performance of GMM-Dif improves with the number of 
time-series observations. In each table, specification 1 reports the results from a regression of 
growth rates on the lagged values of the growth rates and market excess returns while 
specification 2 reports those from a regression of growth rates on the lagged values of the growth 
rates and excess returns of banking industry. The coefficients for both Rm and Rb are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for all three sample groups under all three estimation 
methods. However, the coefficient for Rm is persistently larger than that for Rb: Rm ranges from 
0.021 to 0.023 while Rb ranges from 0.013 to 0.017.  
When both variables enter the regression simultaneously, as reported in specification 3 of 
each table, the coefficient for Rb remains significant at the 5% level under all three estimation 
methods for the full sample and the emerging markets sample. In these specifications, the 
coefficient on Rb ranges from 0.004 to 0.008, implying that a one-standard deviation change in 
bank stock returns (20.9%) would increase economic growth by .004 x .209 = .0008 to .008 x 
.209 = .0017, or 8 to 17 basis points. Certainly, this is economically significant, as the average 
growth rate is 130 basis points. By comparison, the coefficient for Rm ranges from 0.014 to 
0.020, implying that a one-standard deviation change in market returns (15.9%) would increase 
economic growth by .014 x .159 = .0022 to .020 x .159 = .0032, or 22 to 32 basis points . In 
other words, the effect of banking industry stock returns is between one third to one half the 
magnitude of the effect of market stock returns, after controlling for market returns. 
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We expect these results because bank stock returns reflect the market’s expectation of the 
future cash flows for the banking industry, which include cash flows from loans to privately held 
as well as publicly held firms. Market returns should reflect only the market’s expectations of 
future cash flows to publicly trade firms, neglecting expectations about cash flows to privately 
held firms. 
For specification 2, the coefficient of bank excess returns is consistently larger in 
emerging markets than in developed markets across all three estimation procedures, ranging 
from 0.014 to 0.018 in emerging markets but 0.010 to 0.014 in developed markets. These results 
imply that banks are more important to economic growth in emerging markets than in developed 
markets, which is not surprising. In emerging markets, commercial banks are usually the main, if 
not the only source of credit for private firms, whereas, in developed markets, firms often can 
borrow in the corporate bond market and/or from other types of financial intermediaries. This 
conjecture is confirmed by the results of specification 3 where the market excess returns enter 
the regressions; the coefficient for bank excess returns loses the significance for the sample of 
developed markets, but remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
sample of emerging markets, and the magnitude and significance level of the coefficient for Rm 
become much smaller compared with those in specification 1. 
Specifications 4 – 9 of the Tables 3 – 5 present results from sequentially adding a single 
country-specific interaction variable to the specification 3. For specification 4, the coefficient of 
Rb*Gov—the interaction of bank excess returns with government ownership of banks—is 
negative, and statistically significant for the sample of all markets under GMM-Dif estimation 
and for all three sample groups under OLS panel estimation. This indicates that the link between 
bank excess returns and future economic growth is weakened by the greater government 
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ownership of banks. This result is consistent with the previous findings that higher initial 
government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development and 
lower economic growth (La Porta et al. 2002) and that government ownership of banks distorts 
the financial allocation of resources (Sapiens 2004; Dinc 2005). We argue that government 
ownership of banks could also distort the investors’ expectations of banks’ future cash flows, 
which is reflected in the stock prices of the banking industry. 
For specification 5, the coefficient of Rb*Law—the interaction term between bank excess 
returns and insider trading law dummy—is positive and statistically significant for all three 
sample groups under all three estimation methods. This result implies that enforcement of insider 
trading law strengthens the relationship between bank excess returns and future economic 
growth. It is consistent with our expectations because the enforcement of insider trading law is 
not only relevant to market efficiency but also to boosting economic growth by reducing the cost 
of equity and improving market liquidity. 
For specification 6, the coefficient of Rb*Cris—the interaction of bank excess returns 
with the dummy indicator variable for banking crisis years—is positive and statistically 
significant, which is contrary to intuition. However, this result is consistent with related 
literature. Bekaert, et al (2005) show that growth is slower during crisis times, but is 
significantly faster during and after the last year of a crisis. The economy is negatively affected 
when the systemic banking crisis occurs, during and after which a series of financial reforms or 
regulations are likely to be introduced. Smith (2001) argues that the modern banking crises differ 
enormously from historical banking panics in terms of how bank lending and bank reserves are 
affected: bank lending to the private sector as a ratio of GDP rises dramatically and the bank 
reserves do not fall during the modern banking crises. He suggests that the negative impact of 
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banking crises on economic growth could be through M2, whose growth rate declines 
significantly during the banking crises. During the banking crises, failed banks were dropped 
from the banking sector, therefore, the overall earnings potential of banks actually improves; this 
may explain why the impact of the banking crises on the link between bank excess return and 
economic growth is positive. Ranciere et al. (2003) find that countries experiencing occasional 
crises have grown, on average, faster than countries with smooth credit conditions.  
When we divide the sample into developed and emerging markets, we find that the 
coefficient for Rb*Cris is positive and significant at the 1% level for emerging markets, of which 
10 out of 18 markets have experienced systemic banking crises during the sample periods, but is 
not significantly different from zero for developed markets. Hence, the result in Table 3 is driven 
by the subsample of developing markets.  
For specification 7, the coefficient for Rb*Acct—the interaction of bank excess returns 
with the index of bank accounting disclosure standards—is positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with our expectations. However, the coefficient of bank excess returns Rb loses its 
significance under all three estimation methods. This suggests that the information of future 
economic growth contained in the bank excess returns is captured by the bank accounting 
disclosure standards.   
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The results for specification 7 of Table 3 appear to be driven by the data of emerging 
markets, as the coefficient of the accounting standards interaction term is not significantly 
different from zero for the subsample of developed markets. For the emerging markets 
subsample, shown in specification 7 of  panels B in Tables 4 and 5, however, the coefficient of 
the accounting standards interaction term is positive and significant while the coefficient of Rb 
swings from positive and significant to negative but insignificant (p-value >0.12).  
A possible explanation is that emerging stock markets are in transition, increasing in size, 
activity, or level of sophistication, the financial reports could be the primary channel for 
investors in the emerging markets to obtain information on bank performance and exert 
corporate governance, and then regulations on accounting disclosure become relatively more 
important. Another possible interpretation is consistent with related literature (Boyd and Smith, 
1998): due to the scarcity of capital in emerging markets, the monitoring costs are lower relative 
to the cost of capital in developing markets than in developed markets. In emerging markets, 
investors have fewer channels for obtaining information about banks than in developed markets, 
where information about banks is available from a variety of sources; therefore, bank accounting 
disclosure regulations are relatively more important in emerging markets than in developed 
markets.  
Specifications 8 - 10 report results when the interaction term of Rb and the three different 
measures of financial development enters the regressions, respectively. For the full sample, all 
three coefficients are positive and statistically significant under all three estimation methods. 
When we split the sample into developed and emerging markets subsamples, we find that the 
full-sample results also hold for the subsamples of developed and emerging markets. Interaction 
terms are positive and statistically significant for all three sample groups under each of the 
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methods. The results confirm our hypothesis that financial development strengthens the link 
between bank excess returns and economic growth: the more developed is the banking system, 
the more information about future economic growth is contained in the stock prices of the 
banking industry.  
5. Robustness tests 
We also test the robustness of the empirical results from a few angles10. First, instead of 
including market excess returns as an independent variable, we decompose market returns into 
banking sector returns and non-banking sector returns. We address this issue by replacing market 
excess returns with a new variable of non-banking sector returns, measured by subtracting 
banking sector returns from market returns, to all the regressions of the previous section of this 
paper.  The results confirm the empirical results reported in section 4 of this paper. 
Second, we include a new variable that measures the spread of government borrowing 
rates and U.S. T-Bills into the regressions for the sample of emerging markets reported in section 
4.  It is disputable to treat the short-term interest rates on government bonds as the risk-free rates, 
as we did in measuring excess returns, for most of the emerging markets. One may well argue 
that the empirical results related to the emerging countries that were reported in the previous 
section were mainly reflecting the information that high credit spreads on government debt are 
bad for subsequent GDP growth.  We find that high credit spreads on government debt exerts a 
negative impact on future GDP growth rate, however, the inclusion of this variable does not 
change our main findings as reported in the previous section of this paper. 
Third, we replace both market excess returns and bank excess returns with real market 
returns and real bank stock returns and rerun all the regressions of the previous section. Real 
stock return for each market is measured as the difference between stock return and the inflation 
rate. We find the results are consistent with our main findings in the previous section. 
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In summary, we find a positive and significant relationship between bank excess returns 
and future economic growth rates, even in the presence of market excess returns, and this 
relationship is also significantly strengthened by the enforcement of insider trading law, banking 
crises, bank accounting disclosure standards and financial development, but undermined by 
government ownership of banks.  These results are robust in the presence of non-banking sector 
returns and the spread of government borrowings, and are consistent with the different measures 
of bank stock returns11. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we extend the literature on financial development and economic growth by 
analyzing the dynamic relationship between banks and economic growth; more specifically, by 
examining whether banking industry stock returns contain information about future economic 
growth. Using GMM techniques for dynamic panel data to analyze 18 developed and 18 
emerging markets, we find that stock returns of the banking industry can predict future economic 
growth and that this relationship is independent of the previously documented relationship 
between market stock returns and growth. We also find that much of predictive power of bank 
stock returns is captured by a series of country-specific and banking institutional characteristics, 
particularly by banking crises and the enforcement of insider trading law. 
As the first research to link growth with lagged banking industry stock returns, we make 
at least two significant contributions to the literature of finance and growth. First, we provide for 
the first time, evidence of a positive and significant relationship between banking industry stock 
returns and future economic growth that is independent of the relationship between general 
                                                          
11 We also test the robustness of our results to effects of the Asian banking crisis, which impacted several emerging 
market countries simultaneously. Given that emerging stock markets move closely together, this might induce a 
correlation between the error terms of countries. We test whether this affects our results for emerging markets by 
rerunning our regressions without data from the affected Asian countries. Our results are qualitatively unaffected by 
this exclusion. 
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market stock returns and future economic growth previously documented by Fama (1981, 1990) 
and Schwert (1990).  Our findings thus tie together the literature on banks and economic growth 
with that of stock returns and economic growth.  
Second, we analyze for the first time, how a series of country-specific and institutional 
characteristics affect growth through banking industry stock returns. In our panel estimations, we 
address this issue by introducing an interaction term between bank excess returns and the 
indicators of country-specific and banking institutional characteristics, which include 
government ownership of banks, the enforcement of insider trading law, systemic banking crises, 
bank accounting disclosure standards and financial development. We find that much of the 
information about future economic growth contained in bank excess stock returns is captured by 
these country-specific and institutional characteristics, i.e., the positive link between bank excess 
returns and future economic growth is strengthened significantly by the enforcement of insider 
trading law, banking crises, bank disclosure standards and financial development, but 
undermined by government ownership of banks. 
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Table 1: Descriptions and Sources of the Variables 
 
Variable Descriptions and data sources 
 Dependent variable 
GDP growth rate (G) G =  LOG(GDPt / GDPt-1)  Subscript t denotes time period t. The GDP time series are constant prices and, except for the 
markets of Austria, Hong Kong, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey, 
all series are seasonally adjusted. (For Bangladesh and India, we use industrial production because a GDP series is not 
available.) The quarterly GDP series are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS), Datastream International, and 
the OECD national account. 
 Independent variable 
Lagged market excess 
return (Rm) 
 
ittmimitmit
RfPPRRm −== − )/log( )1(     Subscript i denotes country i. Rmit is the excess return on the market index in 
country i for period t (here t is quarter). Pmit is the market price index of country i at the end of period t. The excess return 
is calculated as the difference between the continuous return and the risk-free rate Rf. For the risk-free rate, we use either 
the three-month Treasury Bill rate, the call money market rate or the three-month deposit rate depending on the 
availability of data. The market price indices are extracted from Datastream International. The interest rates are from IFS, 
Datastream International and the OECD national account. 
Lagged excess stock 
returns of the banking 
industry (Rb) 
ittjijitjit
ij
tji
tji
jitjit
ij
jitit RfPPRMC
MC
wwhereRwRRb −==== −
∈
−
−
∈ ∑∑ )/log(;, )1()1(
)1(  
  Subscript i denotes country i and subscript j denotes the individual bank j in country i. Rjit is the excess return of bank j 
in country i for period t (here t is quarter). The excess return is calculated as the continuous stock return less the risk-free 
rate Rf. For the risk-free rate, we use the three-month Treasury Bill rate, call money market rate, three-month deposit rate, 
in superior turns, which depends on the availability of data. wjit is the weight of bank j in the bank industry of country i 
for period t, where weights are based on market capitalization (MC). In other words, the weight of bank j in period t is 
the market capitalization of bank j at the end of period (t-1) divided by the total market capitalization of the banking 
sector at the end of period (t-1) and remains constant within period t. The quarterly stock prices and market 
capitalizations of individual banks are extracted from Datastream International, adjusting for capital changes. The interest 
rates are from IFS, Datastream International, and the OECD national account. 
 Indicators of country and institutional characteristics 
Government 
ownership of banks 
(Gov) 
We construct this variable from table 1 of La Porta, et al (2002). The variable takes the value of one when a country’s 
government ownership of banks is above the median of the sample group. 
Insider trading 
law(Law) 
This variable is constructed from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). The variable changes from zero to one from the year 
when the insider trading law was first enforced. 
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Banking crises(Cris) We construct this variable from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) provide a dataset covering 
117 systemic banking crises (defined as much or all of bank capital being exhausted) that have occurred in 93 countries 
since the late 1970s. We construct a dummy variable that takes on the value of one when a country is undergoing 
systemic banking sector crisis.   
Bank accounting 
disclosure standards 
(Acct) 
This variable is constructed from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) who provide a dataset on bank regulation and 
supervision around the world. We construct the index based on the following five questions: 1) whether the income 
statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or principal on nonperforming loans; 2) whether banks are required to 
produce consolidated financial statements, including nonbank financial affiliates or subsidiaries; 3) whether the off-
balance sheet items are disclosed to the public; 4) whether banks’ directors are legally liable for misleading or erroneous 
information; 5) whether the penalties have been enforced. We assign one to each question if the answer is yes, therefore, 
the maximum index for a country will be five if the answers for all question are yes, and the minimum index will be zero 
otherwise. 
  
Indicators of financial development 
Private credit (Priv) The value of the credit issued by the deposit-taking banks and other financial institutions to the private sector divided by 
GDP. The variable is constructed following the methodology of Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) based on the data from 
International Financial Statistics. Private credit is calculated using the sum of line 22d and 42d, GDP is line 99b, and CPI 
comes from line 64. We calculate the annual private credit for each market and take the average over the sample period. 
 
Liquid liabilities (LL) The value of the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency held outside the banking system plus demand and 
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. The variable is constructed 
following the methodology of Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) based on the data from International Financial Statistics. 
Liquid liabilities are calculated using liquid liabilities (line 551) or money plus quasi money (line 351) if liquid liabilities 
is not available. If neither of these two numbers is available, we use time and saving deposit (line 25). Data for GDP uses 
line 99b; data for CPI comes from line 64. We calculate the annual liquid liabilities for each market and take the average 
over the sample period. 
 
Commercial--
central bank (CCB) 
The ratio of commercial banks’ domestic assets divided by the total domestic assets of commercial banks and 
the central bank. The variable is constructed following the methodology of Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) based on 
the data from International Financial Statistics. We use the lines 22a-d for the assets of deposit money banks, and line 
12a-d for assets of central banks. We calculate the annual commercial central bank for each market and take the average 
over the sample period. 
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Table 2: 
Summary Descriptive Statistics of Bank excess Returns & Economic Growth Rates 
 
Growth is the real GDP growth rate while Rm and Rb are the lagged market excess return and bank excess return. The construction of variables 
refers to Table 1. Statistics for all variables are based on annual data with quarterly observations.  There are 18 developed and 18 emerging 
markets respectively. 
 
 All markets Developed markets Emerging markets 
  Growth Rm Rb Growth Rm Rb Growth Rm Rb 
Descriptive Statistics            
Mean 0.013 -0.061 -0.081 0.011 -0.030 -0.039 0.018 -0.120 -0.163 
Std. Dev. 0.015 0.159 0.209 0.010 0.114 0.133 0.022 0.210 0.290 
Minimum -0.090 -0.902 -2.073 -0.032 -0.453 -0.730 -0.090 -0.902 -2.073 
Maximum 0.092 0.570 0.633 0.060 0.403 0.633 0.092 0.570 0.604 
No. of observation 2067 2067 2067 1369 1369 1369 698 698 698 
            
Correlations           
Growth 1   1   1   
Rm 0.359 1  0.406 1  0.470 1  
Rb 0.295 0.772 1 0.336 0.781 1 0.403 0.744 1 
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Table 3: Dynamic Panel GMM Estimations of Bank Returns,  
Institutional Characteristics and Growth for All Markets 
GMM-Dif Estimations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.036] [0.004] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Lag(G) 0.708 0.734 0.761 0.641 0.668 0.636 0.671 0.689 0.682 0.690
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.023 0.018 0.023 0.026 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.020
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.017 0.008 0.036 -0.011 0.004 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.094
[0.000] [0.012] [0.018] [0.01] [0.197] [0.234] [0.534] [0.664] [0.005]
Rb*Gov -0.011
[0.059]
Rb*Law 0.024
[0.000]
Rb*Cris 0.027
[0.000]
Rb*Acct 0.005
[0.043]
Rb*Priv 0.016
[0.006]
Rb*LL 0.016
[0.042]
Rb*CCB 0.108
[0.002]
Countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 33 35 35 34
NOB 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1869 1947 1947 1889
Constant 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lag(G) 0.755 0.785 0.761 0.720 0.745 0.734 0.763 0.732 0.736 0.740
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.019
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.015 0.006 0.009 -0.009 0.003 -0.013 -0.003 -0.001 -0.078
[0.000] [0.018] [0.018] [0.01] [0.201] [0.148] [0.505] [0.77] [0.011]
Rb*Gov -0.006
[0.155]
Rb*Law 0.017
[0.000]
Rb*Cris 0.018
[0.000]
Rb*Acct 0.005
[0.025]
Rb*Priv 0.012
[0.012]
Rb*LL 0.011
[0.065]
Rb*CCB 0.089
[0.006]
Countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 33 35 35 34
NOB 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 1902 1982 1982 1923
GMM-Sys Estimations
 p-value in parentheses.   
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Table 4: Dynamic Panel GMM-Dif Estimations of Bank Returns, Institutional  
Characteristics and Growth for Developed and Emerging Markets 
Developed markets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.293] [0.044] [0.133] [0.139] [0.332] [0.062] [0.521] [0.339] [0.398] [0.106]
Lag(G) 0.775 0.817 0.750 0.731 0.724 0.744 0.720 0.737 0.730 0.732
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.020
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.014 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.015 -0.015 -0.006 -0.098
[0.000] [0.541] [0.418] [0.272] [0.630] [0.171] [0.001] [0.112] [0.000]
Rb*Gov -0.008
[0.144]
Rb*Law 0.008
[0.026]
Rb*Cris 0.004
[0.339]
Rb*Acct -0.003
[0.245]
Rb*Priv 0.015
[0.000]
Rb*LL 0.006
[0.069]
Rb*CCB 0.103
[0.000]
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 33 18 18 17
NOB 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333 1869 1333 1333 1275
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.004] [0.001] [0.008] [0.023] [0.028] [0.023] [0.030] [0.090] [0.024] [0.095]
Lag(G) 0.675 0.686 0.641 0.653 0.616 0.557 0.610 0.634 0.606 0.647
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.027 0.016 0.014 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.024
[0.001] [0.090] [0.007] [0.022] [0.049] [0.002] [0.000] [0.004] [0.009]
Rb 0.018 0.008 0.016 -0.013 0.003 -0.024 -0.008 -0.010 -0.101
[0.000] [0.026] [0.065] [0.016] [0.589] [0.129] [0.221] [0.254] [0.105]
Rb*Gov -0.011
[0.196]
Rb*Law 0.025
[0.000]
Rb*Cris 0.034
[0.000]
Rb*Acct 0.008
[0.059]
Rb*Priv 0.020
[0.026]
Rb*LL 0.030
[0.002]
Rb*CCB 0.113
[0.088]
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17
NOB 662 662 662 662 662 662 636 614 614 614
Emerging markets
 p-value in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Dynamic Panel GMM-Sys Estimations of Bank Returns, Institutional  
Characteristics and Growth for Developed and Emerging Markets 
Developed markets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lag(G) 0.774 0.827 0.765 0.758 0.751 0.763 0.760 0.749 0.748 0.757
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.019
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.013 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.015 -0.007 -0.088
[0.000] [0.330] [0.817] [0.114] [0.367] [0.484] [0.002] [0.109] [0.000]
Rb*Gov -0.003
[0.519]
Rb*Law 0.008
[0.009]
Rb*Cris 0.006
[0.117]
Rb*Acct 0.001
[0.616]
Rb*Priv 0.013
[0.001]
Rb*LL 0.006
[0.067]
Rb*CCB 0.091
[0.000]
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 33 18 18 17
NOB 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1902 1351 1351 1292
Constant 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lag(G) 0.749 0.766 0.732 0.717 0.722 0.657 0.697 0.697 0.706 0.712
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.023 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.018 0.023
[0.000] [0.010] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.015 0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.003 -0.016 -0.003 -0.005 -0.089
[0.000] [0.014] [0.092] [0.030] [0.348] [0.153] [0.544] [0.412] [0.097]
Rb*Gov -0.006
[0.372]
Rb*Law 0.021
[0.000]
Rb*Cris 0.025
[0.000]
Rb*Acct 0.006
[0.033]
Rb*Priv 0.013
[0.068]
Rb*LL 0.020
[0.010]
Rb*CCB 0.100
[0.077]
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17
NOB 680 680 680 680 680 680 653 631 631 631
Emerging markets
 p-value in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table 1: 
OLS Fixed-Effect Panel Estimations of Bank Stock Returns, 
Institutional Characteristics and Growth for All Markets 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Lag(G) 0.703 0.731 0.701 0.700 0.691 0.670 0.697 0.695 0.695 0.692 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Rm 0.021   0.018 0.017 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.019 
  [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Rb   0.013 0.004 0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.040 
    [0.000] [.011]  [.001]  [.001] [.367] [.917] [.891] [.677] [.012] 
Rb*gov       -0.004             
        [.043]             
Rb*law         0.013           
          [0.000]           
Rb*cris           0.017         
            [0.000]         
Rb*acct             0.001       
              [.316]       
Rb*priv               0.005     
                [.047]     
Rb*ll                 0.008   
                   [.011]   
Rb*ccb                   0.047 
                     [.005] 
R2 0.715 0.705 0.716 0.717 0.708 0.725 0.710 0.715 0.715 0.710 
Adj-R2 0.710 0.699 0.711 0.711 0.702 0.719 0.705 0.710 0.710 0.704 
Countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 33 35 35 34 
No. of 
observations 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 2031 1902 1982 1982 1923 
 
Note:  p-values are in parentheses.  
Each regression also contains country dummy variables that are not reported 
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Appendix Table 2: OLS Fixed-Effect Panel Estimations of Bank Stock Returns, 
 Institutional Characteristics and Growth for Developed and Emerging Markets 
Developed markets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lag(G) 0.773 0.800 0.773 0.773 0.770 0.770 0.776 0.771 0.771 0.768
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.016
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.010 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.004 -0.057
[0.000] [.545] [.740] [.018] [.428] [.968] [.007] [.073] [.015]
Rb*Gov -0.005
[.013]
Rb*Law 0.006
[.002]
Rb*Cris 0.004
[.254]
Rb*Acct 0.000
[.971]
Rb*Priv 0.008
[.005]
Rb*LL 0.005
 [.039]
Rb*CCB 0.060
[.016]
R2 0.761 0.747 0.761 0.762 0.763 0.761 0.747 0.762 0.762 0.742
Adj-R2 0.757 0.743 0.757 0.758 0.759 0.757 0.743 0.759 0.758 0.738
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 18 18 17
NOB 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1351 1249 1351 1351 1292
Emerging markets
lag(G) 0.664 0.696 0.660 0.655 0.646 0.615 0.653 0.643 0.647 0.644
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rm 0.026 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.025
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rb 0.014 0.005 0.011 -0.008 0.002 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 -0.073
[0.000]  [.036] [.010]  [.038]  [.338]  [.345] [.812]  [.488]  [.011]
Rb*Gov -0.007
[.100]
Rb*Law 0.016
[.000]
Rb*Cris 0.020
[0.000]
Rb*Acct 0.004
 [.105]
Rb*Priv 0.010
[.045]
Rb*LL 0.015
 [.053]
Rb*CCB 0.085
[.006]
R2 0.680 0.669 0.682 0.683 0.691 0.696 0.677 0.685 0.685 0.687
Adj-R2 0.671 0.659 0.672 0.673 0.682 0.686 0.667 0.674 0.674 0.676
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 17
NOB 680 680 680 680 680 680 653 631 631 631
 Note:  p-values are in parentheses. Each regression also contains country dummy variables that are not reported 
